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The monster has always been at once intriguing and repulsive, canny and uncanny,
compelling and terrifying. What is most fascinating about monsters throughout literary history,
however, is their resilience. Even those destroyed, like Grendel in Beowulf, haunt the
imagination hundreds (sometimes thousands) of years after their inceptions. Jeffrey Jerome
Cohen, one of the more prolific writers of monster theory, writes:
...the monster can function as an alter-ego, as an alluring projection of (an Other)
self, and monsters ask us how we perceive the world, and how we have
misrepresented what we have attempted to place. They ask us to reevaluate our
cultural assumptions about race, gender, sexuality, our perception of difference,
our tolerance towards it expression. They ask us why we have created them (5).
This is the last of seven "theses" that Cohen lays out for conceptualizing the role of the
monstrous image, and it captures the essence of the monster's enduring appeal. However, a
different kind of monster exists, one that is just as dichotomous as any other monster but which
is also treated “sympathetically,” or, in other words, recast as noble rather than monstrous.
Marie de France's Bisclavret, written in Britain in the late 12th century, exemplifies a
powerful use of the sympathetic werewolf motif, a phenomenon that blatantly subverts and
critiques both the socio-cultural and religious definitions of humanity and monstrosity. The
tensions that result from this subversion intensify in Marie's lai because not only is the monster
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recast as a noble and even moral character, but also the werewolf effectively swaps places with
the main human character in the lai (the wife) both functionally and linguistically. Thus, while
the lai invests the werewolf with moral, human qualities, it simultaneously reduces the wife to a
shockingly primal level of evil and animalism. The “monster” that results from the wife’s
transformation abuses the disjunctions between secular culture and religious mores to advance
her own ends. Therefore, she becomes not Other but rather—to use Kristeva’s vocabulary—
Abject. In other words, this human character descends into her own sort of monstrosity and
comes to embody something that the cultural constructs she abuses both subliminally house and
openly reject. This descent further develops Marie’s critique of society that begins with the
inversion of the werewolf archetype.
This startling inversion is not unique to the Middle Ages, resurfacing most recently in the
Twilight series through the character of Jacob Black, for example. Brent Stypczynski calls this
phenomenon of investing admirable qualities in the werewolf archetype a “sympathetic
werewolf.” The “sympathetic werewolf,” he says, is a werewolf character who “retain[s] the
rational mind, simultaneously glorifying and resisting the idea of metamorphosis (the outer shell
changes, but the core humanity remains intact)” (5). Furthermore, he states that “none of these
figures [sympathetic werewolves] overtly exhibits the traits of true wolves, nor do they exhibit
fully human traits, yet they display idealized characteristics” (18). As Bruckner puts it, “It is
almost as if Marie had taken a bet: could she choose the character who is least likely to inspire
our love and make him loveable nevertheless?” (251). Set in contrast with this “loveable” beast,
the wife’s monstrosity seems even more horrifying.
The question is why? What is accomplished through having the character of the wife—
the epitome of the courtly woman—turned into a cruel, calculating monster while the werewolf
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embodies the exact opposite characteristics? A useful answer to this question involves
examining the lai within its late 12th century social and religious context. On the one hand, the
lai of Bisclavret is in many ways a social commentary, a continuation of the theme of courtly
love that is critiqued throughout the twelve lais. In Bisclavret, this critique continues through the
wife’s malicious misuse of social structure and, more broadly, the contradictions between
appearance and reality. Meanwhile, by setting up the reader's expectation of a werewolf as antihuman, as something completely contrary to a moral and rational being, Marie also invokes the
contemporary theological ideas of the day that often used lycanthropy as a metaphor for what it
means to be or not be human. Theologians at the time argued that the beast is not created in the
image of God and therefore cannot by definition be human (which is understood by the church to
be made in God's likeness); however, at the same time, the beast anthropomorphically reflects
human dual nature as both inherently sinful and capable of good (Stypczynski). By channeling
these contemporary ideas Marie also comments on them. As Williams puts it, in medieval
literature:
The deformed [monster] functioned...as a complementary, sometimes alternative,
vehicle for philosophical and spiritual inquiry... [T]he Middle Ages made
deformity into a symbolic tool with which it probed the secrets of substance,
existence, and form incompletely revealed by more orthodox rational approach
through dialectics (4).
As with the socio-cultural perspective, the idea of misuse is also seen in the religious perspective
through the wife’s ironic contortion of morals and biblical undertones in her speeches, which she
shapes into a mask to cover her own immoral acts of trapping her husband in bestial form and
leaving him for another man.
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While the wife significantly misuses courtly and religious ideals, she goes even a step
further and sets two against one another, revealing the dangerous gaps between them. Within the
social context of the lai, both courtliness and religion were equally significant forces in the
medieval world, but glaring points of disunion existed between the two. The wife wields the two
in such a way that she makes the disconnections more apparent, forcing the reader to look at the
secular and religious culture together and understand the potential dangers that face a society
defined by such unresolved dichotomies. Furthermore, Marie shows that, as often spiritual and
the secular aspects of life conflict, they are both infected by the same disease. That disease is not
lycanthropy, demon possession, or serial killing; it is the small lies, the subcutaneous twisting of
things, and the shiny appearances painted over it all that together unchecked can insidiously
consume a culture.
The lai of Bisclavret starts with an immediate contradiction—presented almost
completely without transition—that sets the stage for the tensions to come. Marie begins her lai
by setting up her readers to expect a typical bad werewolf, and then she turns those expectations
around to tell a story about a werewolf who is in many ways the most noble, rational, and moral
character of the lai in spite of the fact that outwardly he looks like a beast. Her brief introduction
describes how the werewolf is traditionally perceived as a “savage beast” (9) that “eats men
[and] does much harm” (11) 1. This initial description is unsurprising, but then without pause,
Marie jumps from this description to saying, “But that’s enough of this for now / I want to tell
you about Bisclavret” (12-13). Thus, she quickly dismisses everything she has just said about
werewolves and plunges into her own story, which begins with a romantic description of the

1

I have consulted three different translations of Bisclavret for this paper. Unless otherwise noted,
quotations are taken from the Hanning and Ferrante verse translation (1978).
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knight named Bisclavret. She says that he is “fine, handsome…nobl[e]…and loved by all his
neighbors” (16-20). This is the extent of the introduction we get to the character of Bisclavret,
and it subverts the reader’s expectations built up by the opening lines. This sets up the tension
between what the reader expects in the contents of her lai and what is actually there, as well as
the tension between the way the characters are perceived by others and who they really are.
After introducing Bisclavret in such an unusual way, Marie shifts her focus to introduce
the character of the wife, whose voice is surprisingly much more prominent than that of the title
character. What we know of Bisclavret is almost exclusively informed by the way others
perceive him rather than through direct narration, but we are made quite aware of the wife’s
actions and perceptions of the things that transpire. The first line in which the wife appears
focuses on two primary aspects of her character: her attractiveness and her apparent worthiness.
The line reads, “femme ot espuse mut vailant / e que mut feseit beu semblant" or "as his wedded
wife he had a woman who was worthy and attractive in appearance 2” (21-22). “Semblant,” the
present participle of the Anglo-Norman verb sembler (which means to seem or appear), receives
the most emphasis of these lines because it comes at the very end of the sentence. After all of
the good things said about the wife, these lines end in a word that casts doubt on these sentiments
by emphasizing the way the wife acts and appears to the observer. She seems good and worthy,
but these traits are called immediately into question by the wording. Within the first scene, these
appearances are further subverted by the wife’s actions.

2

Burgess and Busby prose translation
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The subversion is most blatant in the first dialogue between Bisclavret and his wife,
during which the wife manipulatively badgers her husband to tell her his secret using every
instrument at her disposal. The tone of this passage is extremely biblical, echoing many of the
same motifs found in the narrative of Samson and Delilah. Just as Delilah begs to know the
secret behind Samson’s superhuman strength, the wife begs to know the secret behind
Bisclavret’s un-human transformation. In addition to this, Bruckner notes a similarity between
this scene and the fall of Adam and Eve, a comparison which would, in a sense, make this a story
of a fall from innocence for both of them. While this analogy certainly is limited in its
usefulness, it fits well with the consequence of the wife’s sin: the absence of a nose. Some have
pointed to the lack of a nose as a symbol of leprosy, a very biblical punishment. This also may
explain the oddity of this trait being passed down to the wife’s daughters.
While the wife consciously or unconsciously models these stories from the biblical
narrative, she also abuses biblical and moral reasoning to give herself the appearance of a
“Christian” woman while simultaneously working towards her own ends. This abuse is seen
most clearly in the way the wife implores Bisclavret to tell her his secret, accuses him of
infidelity and ultimately extracts from him the key to his metamorphosis. There are a few
examples of just how she accomplishes this manipulation of biblical morals which can be seen
clearly in this first dialogue between her and Bisclavret. She blatantly accuses him of three main
things of which she herself is guilty: fear, dishonesty, and adultery. At this point, she herself is
afraid for her own future (and should be at least somewhat afraid of being married to a
werewolf), is lying to Bisclavret to his face, and will soon commit adultery with the first man she
can think of. Ironically, the very first of the three that she jumps to in her volley of accusations
is adultery. She says plainly, “mun escïent que vus amez / e si si est, vus meserrez” (51-52). (“I
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think you must have a lover / and if that’s so, you’re doing wrong.”) Thus, she is condemning
the very sin she will commit only a short time later. Meanwhile, as she plants that seed of doubt
in her husband’s faithfulness, she also attacks his integrity and masculinity by pleading with him,
saying, “Nel me devez nïent celer / ne [mei] de nule rien duter” (81-82). (“You mustn’t hide
anything from me / or fear me in any way.”) Utilizing the unassuming nature of a pleading tone,
she essentially makes herself the victim of the situation by accusing him of wronging her. He is
hiding things from her and not having faith in her; his actions are immoral. At this point, he has
already told her that he becomes a werewolf, but she still persists that he is hiding something
from her. Rather than straightforwardly asking the expected question of what he does as a
werewolf, the wife instead manipulatively accuses Bisclavret of being both a liar and coward to
pressure him into telling her the location of the one thing that allows him to become human
again: his clothes.
Her request to know where his clothes are even as she protests that she loves him “plus
que tut le mund,” is key because it indicates that she is already plotting to dispose of him (80).
Because Bisclavret has told her the secret of his transformation, the wife knows that taking his
clothes will make it impossible for her husband to become a human again. He will be doomed to
remain a wolf indefinitely. As noted by Lecouteux, clothing is a key definer of humankind. So,
while Bisclavret is in lupine form, he has no clothing, no voice, no weapons, no social status or
“name”—no semblance of humanity. In taking his clothes, the wife also takes away all trappings
of humanity from him so that he cannot externally be identified as human anymore. Furthermore,
as an animal, he is also no longer in the image of God, so his soul is in question as well. Thus,
the wife fully knows what she may be taking from her husband, and yet she persists for her own
benefit. Meanwhile, her actions are full of hypocrisy. As she accuses him of fear and

Bennett-8
dishonesty, she exemplifies these very vices. In a way, it is as though she blames him for all
wrong so that she can acquit herself in her mind while simultaneously taking the keen nose of
society off of the scent of her own wrongdoing. It seems the perfect cover.
If her conduct were merely the cause of her misinterpreting moral and spiritual authority,
her actions might be more understandable and even justifiable. However, there is a difference
between misinterpretation and misuse. While misinterpretation often leads to misuse, misuse is
possible without misinterpretation. In fact, it would require a very accurate interpretation and
understanding of biblical authority and “Christian” morals in order to manipulate them in the
way that the wife does in her dealings with Bisclavret. She is not merely twisting the meaning of
something, but rather she is abusing moral consciousness to hide her misdeeds while trying to
keep its essential exterior intact, effectively covering up her tracks.
These actions are significant considering how they contrast with the actions of Chaucer’s
character the Wyf of Bath, for example, who misinterprets biblical “autorite.” The Wyf of Bath,
however, misconstrues the meanings not to intentionally hide aspects of her conduct or character
but merely to justify them. Bisclavret’s wife does both, which takes a much more conniving,
intelligent, and relatively well-informed sort of character. Where the Wyf of Bath openly
confesses her actions, the wife of Bisclavret attempts to conceal. She acts much more like the
scholar Nicholas in Chaucer’s “Miller’s Tale,” a man who twists the biblical story of Noah and
thereby abuses the poor carpenter John’s trusting and benevolent nature in order to “swyve”
John’s wife, the fair young Alisoun. While Bisclavret was written a little over 200 years before
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, Bisclavret’s wife has just this sort of deviousness about her that
Nicholas has, suggesting that the misuse of scripture and morals is just as significant an issue in
the 1400’s as it was in the late 1100’s.
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Meanwhile, at the same time as this moral manipulation occurs, the wife also tries to look
the part of the courtly lady and use courtly ideals to rationalize her manipulation of religious
mores and appearances. A contemporary of Marie de France, Andreas Capellanus outlines the
“rules” for courtly love in medieval society (seriously or sarcastically) in his treatise De Amore,
which gives a picture of what might have been running through the wife’s mind. Though the
greatest concern of the treatise is dedicated to knightly chivalry, the text also describes
expectations for the lady to be beautiful, well-spoken, and especially of good character. All of
these are qualities which the wife clearly “appears” to have, based on the opening lines. In the
idea of courtly love, there is also the expectation that a lady will inspire a knight to noble or
heroic deeds. For this reason, it is not unusual for a man to go off to war in order to win the
affections of a lover. The lady is an object of desire, a prize that is usually admired from afar
and to whom a knight will humbly subject himself by doing great deeds for her sake.
Perhaps this last point is a motivation for the wife of Bisclavret to turn against her
husband. For one, he is no longer subjecting himself to her, and he is also not going off to war or
being heroic; rather, he turns into a werewolf and does unknown horrors (for all she knows) in
the forest. He is not achieving glory or expressing his nobility in battle for her, but rather, at least
in her perspective, he is viciously misplacing masculine aggression in a form that is not socially
acceptable. It seems as though she knows that his reality reflects poorly on her own role as his
wife and that, if the secret were divulged, it would greatly affect her social status because the
lady’s position in society is directly affected by the man she marries. For example, if a woman
marries into a class above that of her birth, she becomes part of the upper class (Capellanus).
Thus, her social wellbeing may depend on a volatile creature. Furthermore, if the court
discovered Bisclavret’s secret, both of them would suffer the consequences based solely on his
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nature. Her actions, then, would seem to be focused on her own preservation as a lady in society
and would seem to be based initially on her fear that her husband’s secret could ruin her. He
knows the risk as well, saying, “Harm will come to me if I tell you about this, / because I’d lose
your love / and even my very self” (54-56). If anyone learns his secret, he is endangered in more
than one way. Even though he specifically addresses his wife, it seems as though in these lines
he recognizes the probability that he would lose the good graces of not just her but anyone with
whom he shares this secret. In theory, the wife does not want to be pulled down along with him.
Thus, the wife makes the choice to manipulate her appearance as an ideal courtly lady in order to
mask over her true intentions to get rid of the threat to her status, thus rationalizing her irrational
and un-human behavior. She then marries a respectable knight—whom she admits she does not
love—in order to maintain her social status without her husband. As Freeman puts it:
By burying her husband alive in this way, the Lady is effectively able to assume
the appearance of a widow and shortly thereafter that of a new bride, convinced
that she has forever avoided revealing herself as the wife of a monster. The wife
has indeed devoured the human being who was her husband, having made him as
well as her lover, prey to her own ambitions and pride. (294)
The new knight thus serves only two purposes for her: helping her dispose of her old husband
and marrying her so that she can remain comfortable in society.
Furthermore, not only does the wife try to use courtly ideals to justify her misuse of
religious language, but she also manipulates the popular observation of her husband’s habitual
absences to validate her remarriage in the larger view of society and to release herself from the
bonds of commitment to Bisclavret. In other words, she uses his permanent absence and the
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suggestion of his infidelity (both of which she herself creates) in order to save her own
reputation, a move that eventually leads to her downfall. Others in the neighborhood have
noticed that he is regularly missing, expect it, and then quickly accept that he has gone for good
of his own accord when he does not return. Since they knew how often he was away from home,
the members of the court responded without much surprise or any suspicion:
All thought
this time he’d gone away forever.
They searched for him and made inquiries
but could never find him,
so they had to let matters stand. (128-32)
In the process of manufacturing this outcome, the wife, as Buckner puts it, “…has undergone…a
transformation as profound as Bisclavret’s own repeated metamorphosis, a transformation that
takes the narrator’s complimentary phrase about her good appearance and turns it into a
question” (258). The curious thing is that a form of the same word that was used earlier to
describe the wife’s appearance (semblant) is used again only a few lines later when the wife calls
Bisclavret’s love for her into question. “Ne semblereit pas amiste” or “that would not appear to
be true love,” she says as she berates him for keeping secrets from her (83). Meanwhile, her own
speech drips with hypocrisy as she proclaims that she loves him “plus que tut le mund” (80).
Notice again that she says this after she has learned that he is a werewolf and also after he has
told her that he goes without his clothes, the only two provocations provided in the text for her
betrayal of him. Given that no other reasons are supported by the text, at this point it is safe to
assume that the wife has—by the time she utters this profession of love—already decided that
she no longer wants to be with him. Perhaps even as early as this line, the wheels in the wife’s

Bennett-12
mind are moving in the direction of betrayal. Therefore, her hyperbolic insistence that she loves
him, coupled with her accusations, proves duplicitous. Thus, in just a few short lines, the wife
goes from having the appearance of a noble and valiant woman, to throwing the question of
appearances at Bisclavret, and, in doing so, having the question thrust back upon herself. She
still looks the same outwardly, but in this dialogue she manipulates the tenuous question of
appearances for her own advantage to indict her husband while releasing herself from obligation
to actually live up to her own appearances (while still maintaining these appearances for the sake
of maintaining her reputation within society).
As readers, we witness a complete metamorphosis revealing her true nature, but at this
point, to the rest of the world within the lai, Bisclavret is still the villain who left his wife for no
reason. As with the religious expectations, the wife takes hold of courtly ideals of what love
looks like and abuses them to both pressure Bisclavret and make way for her own immorality,
which the larger society does not perceive because she still upholds the proper appearances.
Thus, through this one conversation in the lai, the wife works on two very different but not
entirely distinct levels by bending to her own will the identifiers of both courtly society and
contemporary religious ideals of morality. It takes some rather ingenious subtlety, and yet to the
reader, the contrast between the reality of the wife’s actions and the image she projects to
disguise and even validate her conduct is as apparent as the nose on her face.
Some have tried to read the wife much more sympathetically than this. Stypczynski, for
example, claims that “the wife’s horror is understandable on two levels” (57). The first level he
supplies is that she may then become a mother to a garwulf, a creature that would in turn cause
harm to society. This first suggestion seems improbable since it is difficult to believe that
someone so intent on ruining her husband (and marrying someone she does not even love to
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achieve that end) would be capable of such altruism. The second level that Stypczynski suggests
is that, “by sleeping with the wolf-in-knight’s clothing, one could argue that she technically
commits the sin of bestiality” (58). Stypczynski argues from this that “she clearly sees adultery
as the lesser of two evils, perhaps one that is even cancelled out by her rejection of the monstrous
beast” (58). He goes so far as to suggest that legitimate fear for her own soul may propel the
wife’s actions.
However, it is clear that the wife’s actions are not primarily grounded in either concern
for society at large or for her soul, the latter especially considering that she does more than just
commit adultery. Rather, as has been illustrated previously, she subverts not just morals but also
courtly ideals on more than one level in a way that is malicious and carefully calculated. While
the fear of continued bestiality and the possibility of werewolf progeny may have crossed her
mind and contributed to her choice, fear for her soul does not seem to be a primary motivation
for her. If it were, she certainly would not manipulate the two systems of society in the way that
she does. As we have seen, the wife is fully conscious that her misuse of courtly ideals to
justify her misuse of the religious ideals will succeed in outwardly acquitting her because she is
also aware that courtly and religious ideals of the time conflict at a few very crucial points. She
knows that, by manipulating the major points of disunion between both cultural constructs, she
will be allowed to slip through the cracks and get away with acts that are not endorsed by either
church or society. This is her main goal: to preserve herself and her personal comfort by hiding
away in the “safe” crevice created between secular and religious society. Thus, she comes to
embody the evils of both church and society and highlight the dangers of having these two
overlapping and co-dominant cultural constructs at such odds with one another that they can be
manipulated to work against each other.
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Meanwhile, just as the wife’s voice and her manipulations of church and society supply
one significant layer to the lai’s critique of social and religious constructs, Marie’s use of
language constitutes an additional layer. While the court perceives the werewolf and wife in
terms of unhuman and human that rest solely on the shoulders of external identifiers, Marie
provides the reader with a linguistic detail that reveals the popular perception as faulty: the
contrast between the named and the unnamed. In spite of having no name apparent to the king
and the court members while in bestial form, the werewolf does have a name to the reader: the
name of Bisclavret. Meanwhile, the wife is as nameless to the reader as she will be noseless to
the rest of the world at the end of the lai.
As the character that embodies the true evils of society and religion, the wife is presented
as a common noun, a thing with no identifier other than “wife” (femme), and occasionally “lady”
(dame). Contrast this with the way that Marie changes the common noun Bisclavret into a
proper noun. He has a proper identifier, but it is one that—like his wife’s generalized
appellation—is laden with irony. The werewolf’s identifier “Bisclavret” literally means
“werewolf” in Anglo Norman; however, by changing it from the common to the proper noun,
Marie is forging a different set of associations with the word “Bisclavret,” associations that are
the exact opposite of those vested in the common noun werewolf. She redefines the word
“Bisclavret” to mean something noble, moralizing, and rational: characteristics that are never
found in traditional werewolves while they are in the shape of a beast.
In the meantime, the de-identification of the wife (which is accomplished through
keeping her nameless) also strips the term “wife” of all the meaning it has accrued within the
social and religious context. She is not Woman as named by Adam in Genesis nor is she The
Courtly Lady of medieval society; she becomes to the reader something seemingly Other created

Bennett-15
in the absence of proper appellation. In her transformation, the wife twists even the language
used to describe her so that the common noun “wife” as used within the lai no longer means what
it appears to mean. She is no longer wife of Bisclavret in any sense of the word, carrying no
obligations towards him and having married another man, and yet she is still referred to as such.
Thus, the term “wife” in reference to her means nothing now and therefore is lowered to the
status of primal utterance. To call the woman “wife” is to give a bestial grunt that has no real
signification, and yet at the same time, in becoming such an unhuman term, the word “wife” now
perfectly reflects the reality of who she is. In this way, the seeming humanness of the “wife” is
obscured, and the core of her character is revealed to the reader.
Thus, to borrow a term from Derrida and Levi-Strauss, the use of names becomes a form
of bricolage, an manufacturing of whatever elements may be on hand to serve a particular
purpose without regard to their original function, something the wife has been doing this entire
time with the instruments of religious and courtly society. The most important aspect of this,
however, is not so much the in newness of Marie’s (and the wife’s) usage but in the difference—
the space—between the original and actual usage, especially in the case of the characters’ names.
This serves its purpose because, as Derrida describes it, “Language bears in itself the necessity of
its own critique.” The same is true for the names and un-names that Marie uses. Placing the
name “Bisclavret” and the-un name “femme” side by side creates a subtle form of linguistic
freeplay, a strategy which allows each name to reveal their shifting significations that, in effect,
swap places with one another. “Wife” changes twice, in fact. It changes from meaning “married
woman” loaded with all its cultural connotations to becoming, much more broadly, a sign of all
that appears human. At the same time as it does this, however, it moves from appearing human
to being metaphorically and then later visibly bestial. Meanwhile, the beast is being
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simultaneously redefined as human, to the point that even the bestial act of tearing off the wife’s
nose at the end is redefined as something that is moralizing and restorative. All of this serves to
further accentuate the already rife tensions within the text of Bisclavret. The question that
remains is: to what end is this tension building?
The crucial twist here is, of course, that to the rest of the world the wife does still appear
to be Woman and Lady because technically she is still a member of the social and religious
spheres that she is simultaneously working against. Thus, she is a terrifying abjection, an object
whose image is sublimated by both church and society but who is in reality representative of
everything that church and society reject. However, soon it will become apparent to the wife’s
audience that all is not as it seems. The process towards this realization begins in the forest
when the king happens to run across Bisclavret and is astonished by the “humanity” of the thing
he perceives as animal. The king exclaims, “ele ad sen de hume, merci crie…/ este beste ad
entente e sen" or “it has the mind of a man, and it’s begging me for mercy…/ this beast is
rational—he has a mind!” (154-7). Again, we see the werewolf from someone else’s eyes, so
there is a sense of distance created between the reader and the werewolf character. This time,
we see him through the eyes of the court members, who, for the first time in the lai, experience a
shift in interpretation. Previously, interpretation of occurrences has been made solely based on
the presence or absence of certain identifiers (as explored earlier through the character of the
wife). This is the first instance, however, when someone looks beyond the exterior trappings and
realizes something beneath the surface, something that has been concealed in some way or
another. It is not a total shift, though, because it is still based on the wolf’s human action of
prostrating himself before the king. It is, however, a significant step in the right direction.
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The pivotal turn that Marie makes that finally brings the true character of the “wife” to
the forefront is the scene in which Bisclavret rips the nose from the wife’s face, and it is the key
to unlocking all that is pent up behind the multiple layers of tension. It does this in two ways:
first by its restorative properties and second, paradoxically, by its dissonance. First, the tearing
of the wife’s nose is the culminating act that restores morality to the lai by providing the
necessary restitution for the abhorrent crimes the wife has committed. It also finally produces an
exterior symbol for the internal reality that the wife has been attempting to conceal. Marie
writes, “Oiez cu m il est bien vengiez! / le neis li esracha del vis” or “Now listen how well he
avenged himself! / He tore the nose right off her face” (235). This occurs within a rather
interesting set of circumstances. The wife has come to the king because it seems she has heard
about how Bisclavret attacked her husband, and we can assume that she is probably suspicious at
this point about the identity of Bisclavret. So, she again focuses on her appearance, "dress[ing]
herself elegantly…/ bringing rich presents for [the king]" (228-30). Thus, she presents herself to
the king looking her best, but this time her manipulative strategy fails, and she is publicly
denosed by her own former husband. As Freeman describes it, in the most bestial act he
performs, "[Bisclavret] is in fact at his most noble and chivalric attacking the enemy as she
betrays King, husband, and author — fealty, fidelity in marriage, and feminine courtliness"
(296). Suddenly, in front of everyone, she finally looks like the monster she is, and, not long
afterwards, the truth is discovered and the wolf-man Bisclavret finally returns to his human
appearance that more accurately reflects his moral and social consciousness than did the image
of the perpetual werewolf. Things are finally set right, though we may perhaps assume that,
having not been cured from his werewolf-ness, Bisclavret will continue the cyclical man-tobeast-to-man transformation.
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In the ending, a sense of rightness has been created that “resolves” the tensions in the lai
as the now obviously monstrous wife is exiled and Bisclavret is restored physically and socially.
At the same time, however, there is still an important dissonance: not all questions are answered
in the end. The tale may seem to wrap itself up tightly in a good-triumphs-over-evil happilyever-after ending, but as we have already seen, things are not always as they seem. Rather than
neatly tying up the loose ends, Marie leaves hanging the dual and conflicting nature of the
werewolf himself. He is not cured, nor does the larger cultural concept of werewolf change in
any way. Furthermore, we are left haunted by the reverberating sound of doubt in the way things
appear because throughout the entire lai everything external has been systematically questioned
and redefined—from religious and social appearances down to the very names that the characters
bear. What is true now that we have deconstructed every semblance?
Apparently, the lai is true. At least, that’s what Marie tells us very pointedly in the very
last few lines of the poem: "l'avenutre ke avez oïe//veraie fu, n'en dutez mie" (315-16). In other
words, the adventure that you just heard is true, so don’t doubt it. What does this mean? In the
end, what has this lai accomplished? The trueness of the tale is that it calls into question the
cultural constructs being manipulated—the society and the church—by revealing their flaws and
severely critiquing their potential for misuse. This is especially important since one of the
reasons the wife gets away with everything for so long is because society and the church have
different and conflicting standards. The wife’s actions falls into the gap between the two social
constructs, a disconnection that can have disastrous results.

Thus, in the end, the reversal of the

monster motif develops a critique of a society in which two of the most important social
standards are often at odds with one another. The spaces that are created between them are
dangerous because, as seen through the wife’s character, they can be manipulated for purposes
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not intended by either cultural construct. For this reason, the kinds of things that the church and
secular society were concerned about at the time (such as lycanthropy) are shown to be less
disastrous than the inherent structure of that society with its unresolved tensions between the
religious and the secular. The gravest dangers that society faces, therefore, lie not in the obvious
monsters but rather in the tenuousness and malleability of a conflicting culture.
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